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ABSTRACT 
Although not as frequent in nature as ignitions on continuous miner or longwall faces, ignitions of methane on roof bolters have 
caused serious injuries to underground coal miners. After reviewing the accident reports for all roofbolter ignitions from 1981 
to 1998, a summary of the forty-one accidents has been developed. Of interest in the database is the ignition source, method 
offace ventilation, local velocity, methane liberation, size of the methane body ignited, and the duration of the flame. Three 
example ignitions are included. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Upon notification of a methane ignition, MSHA enforcement 
personnel conduct an investigation of the accident. The 
reports are kept in an accident database by MSHA Technical 
Support for future reference. Ignitions on roof bolters were 
reviewed to determine similarities and trends for this type of 
accident. The database was searched from 1981 to 1998, 
including all reported methane i~tions. Most ignitions did 
not cause serious injury. However, the potential for disaster 
does exist as seen in the accident database analysis. This 
paper summarizes the data from 41 accident investigation 
reports for ignitions on roofbolting machines in underground 
bituminous coal mines. 
TYPICAL BOLTER IGNITIONS 
With few exceptions, the typical roofbolter ignition has been 
a non-injury accident. Injuries to miners as a direct result of 
ignitions have occurred in cases where ventilation controls 
were not properly maintained, required airflow quantities 
were not maintained, or permissibility of equipment was not 
maintained. 
Most ignitions required miners to extinguish flames using 
fire extinguishers, rock dust or water. Only six were self-
extinguishing. Most events lasted less than six minutes. 
Ignitions lasting more than one minute were normally 
ignitions which ignited methane feeders in the face or along 
the rib. While methane is generally ignited at the drill hole, 
three in four ignitions propagated beyond the drill hole. 
Many ignitions seem to coincide with unusual mining 
conditions. Many reports indicate unusually hard roof 
conditions and excessive bit wear as contributing factors. 
Other circumstances include bolting in caved areas, where 
methane accumulations are more likely to occur. It seems a 
significant factor in these ignitions is the mine methane 
liberation rate. 
METHANE LIBERATION 
The distribution of methane liberation rates for all 
underground coal mines is shown in Figure 1. Approximately 
I 0 percent of the mines liberate in excess of 200,000 cubic 
feet of methane per day, and 5 percent exceed one million 
cubic feet in a single day. Bolter methane ignitions have 
occurred in a small percentage of all underground mines, 
which are all considered to be some of the gassiest. For all 
forty one ignitions, mine methane liberation exceeded 
850,000 cubic feet per day. 
Two of the 41 ignition accident reports indicated methane 
tests were not made prior to bolting. Of the remaining 
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thirty-nine, measured levels did not exceed 1 percent. The 
highest methane reading reported was 0.9 percent prior to 
bolting. 
"Legal" gas checks are required by 30 CFR 75.362 before 
a bolter is taken into or operated in a working place. Testing 
is also required every 20 minutes while in the working place. 
All tests must be taken while under supported roof, which in 
the case of a roof bolter requires the use of an extendable 
probe to test the area between the bolter and the face. 
The location of tests is specified in 30 CFR 75.323 as at 
least one foot from the roof, face, ribs and floor. This may be 
one reason bolter operators do not detect very thin methane 
accumulations in pockets or layers along the roof. 
Another is that it is very difficult to detect thin layers 
along the roof (Mitchell, 1996). In describing the ignitions, 
accident reports indicate the methane bodies are very small 
and are not of an ignitable concentration within the entire 
working place. Most were identified as thin layers along the 
roof. Methane layers can be avoided by providing adequate air 
velocity in the bolting place. Velocities required to control 
layering in typical working places may be as high as 200 feet 
per minute or more depending upon the methane inflow rate 
(Hartman, 1997). 
IGNITION SOURCES 
Accident reports identified ignition sources in all but two of 
the ignitions. One was ignited by equipment electrical 
conductors as the bolter was not maintained in permissible 
condition. The remaining 38 accidents were caused by similar 
circumstances, including overheated drill steels, frictional 
heating, overheated bits or sparking bits. A graph of the 
ignition sources is included in Figure 2. All of the 38 
accidents were ignited at the drill hole. 
Ten of the ignitions were confined to the immediate drill 
hole location. Eighteen propagated to the face and 9 
propagated both to the face and outby the bolting machine. 
Three propagated to the rib from the bolt hole. 
FACE VENTILATION :METHOD 
Much work has been completed by MSHA and the former US 
Bureau of Mines concerning the comparison of the effective-
ness of blowing and exhausting face ventilation systems. 
Blowing systems have a greater effectiveness in controlling 
methane, while exhaust systems are more effective for dust 
control (Dalzell, 1966, Mundell, 1977). 
While some ventilation systems were not described within 
the accident reports, most did report the type of face 
ventilation system used while bolting (Figure 3). The majori-
ty (59 percent) of the ignitions occurred on sections using 
exhaust ventilation. A total of 28 percent used blowing face 
ventilation. or a combination of blowing and exhausting 
ventilation. Five accident reports indicated adequate 
ventilation was not provided to the bolter as required by the 
approved ventilation plan. 
INJURIES 
Most bolter ignitions do not cause injuries to equipment 
operators. Of the 10 injuries reported, only three occurred as 
a direct result of the initial ignition. All three of these injuries 
occurred in the two ignitions where no methane checks were 
made prior to bolting. 
The remaining seven were due to firefighting activities. 
One operator fell off of his machine and another received 
burns in one accident. Five persons were burned in a 
secondary ignition while rock dusting in the cavity of a fall 
area. 
EXAMPLES 
The following report excerpts have been taken from actual 
MSHA accident investigation reports. All three are for 
accidents which occurred in Alabama -sixty-three percent of 
all roofbolter ignitions from this study happened in Alabama 
mines. 
Example 1 
The greatest number of injuries caused by a bolter ignition 
was in 1990 at a mine in Alabama. The mine liberated 14.4 
million cubic feet of methane daily. 
Approximately 21 feet of the roof 2 Y2 feet thick near the 
face in an en try had fallen out and needed to be cleaned up 
before bolting in the place could be completed. The entry was 
being bolted up to the fall. Methane checks prior to bolting 
indicated 0. 8 to 0. 9 percent methane was present in the place. 
The bolter operator was in the process of spinning the bolt 
resin for a bolt in the fourth row in the place which was just 
outby the fall as shown in Figure 4. This location was 
approximately 18 feet from the face. Sparks caused by contact 
between the roof bolt plate and strap ignited a methane 
mixture. The flames were extinguished by using four fire 
extinguishers. 
The miners, after concluding the flames were extinguished, 
backed out the bolter and trammed in a scoop to rock dust the 
area. After applying dust for a few seconds, flames started 
from the face area and came outby over the men causing five 
miners to be treated for burns, smoke inhalation and shock. 
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The flames were extinguished with water and foam from a 
foam generator. The methane body in the cavity had not been 
extinguished prior to rock dusting. The slow burning body 
became explosive with the disturbance caused by the rock 
dusting. 
The section used a blowing face ventilation system- however, 
the blowing curtain was not installed as per the requirements 
0f the approved mine ventilation plan. An exhaust curtain 
was installed with the air quantity behind the curtain 




This second example also occurred at an Alabama mine in 
1993. The mine liberated 20 million cubic feet of methane 
each day. Methane checks prior to bolting indicated 0.6 to 
0. 8 percent methane was present in the section. The section 
used a combination blowing and exhausting brattice face 
ventilation system. The curtains provided 10,400 cubic feet 
per minute to the face, but the curtains were hung so tight 
that they allowed methane from a feeder in the roof to 
Figure 4. Bolter ignition example number 1. 
accumulate in a roof layer between the curtains. 
The bolter operator was drilling through steel channel into 
the roof approximately 25 feet from the face when sparks 
caused by contact between the drill steel and channel ignited 
the methane mixture which had migrated out of the curtained 
area. The flames were extinguished by using fire 
eh.'tinguishers, water and foam. One head injury to a roof 
bolter operator occurred at the onset of the ignition. A second 
injury due to inhaling fire extinguisher material ·occurred 
during fire fighting activities. 
Example 3 
This third example also occurred at an Alabama mine in 
1982. The mine liberated over 20 million cubic feet of 
methane each day. Methane checks prior to bolting indicated 
0.4 to 0. 7 percent methane was present no closer than 12 
inches from the roof, ribs and faces in the bolting place. The 
section used an exhausting face ventilation system. The 
curtain provided 27,000 cubic feet per minute to the face area 
as measured at the end of the curtain, and was 6 Y2 feet from 
the face at the time of the ignition. 
The bolter operator was drilling through extremely hard 
sandy shale in the roof when the drill steel became stuck. 
While lowering the steel from the hole, it fell against the face, 
igniting the body of methane. The flames were extinguished 
by using a fire extinguisher. This accident occurred in spite 
of the ventilation provided. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Most roof bolting ignitions can be avoided by maintaining 
ventilation requirements and making required examinations 
for methane. Awareness of potential for methane layering is 
also important for bolter operators for identifying this 
potential hazard. Additional tests for methane layering nearer 
to the roof, and additional ventilation measures in the gassiest 
seams, would decrease the potential for ignitions and methane 
layering. 
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Figure 2. Roof bolter ignition sources. 
Figure 3. Type of face ventilation system used in mines with ignitions. 
